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Abstract
Land grabbing by foreign investors is a growing problem for the Global South. Rice
production in Mali is no exception. To counter this trend, there is a greater push from
countries like Mali for food security and food sovereignty. Despite this push, decentralization
and a lack of government funds have led Mali to sign multiple agreements with multinational
companies. The Malibya Society, a partnership between Mali and Libya, is one of these
investors that could jeopardize Mali’s autonomy. This paper will describe the details of the
project, the reactions of government officials, peasant organizations, and farmers, and what
Malians can do or are doing to combat the problems that put them in this situation.
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Methodology
After hearing about the joint agricultural investment project between Libya and Mali,
Malibya, I became interested in the type of rice that would be used and how people in the area
would be affected. I wanted to study varieties of rice grown in Mali and which aspects of
local and enriched rice are beneficial in production and for consumption. The first few people
I talked to about Malibya in Bamako did not know the specifics of the project, which only
encouraged me to further explore the subject. Furthermore, when I researched the project for
background information, I found that little information was available. I decided to go to
Niono to meet farmers who are being affected by the project.
My first limitation surfaced when I realized that even people in Niono did not know
the specific details about the project because it is still in its beginning stages. No one was
informed of Malibya’s plans before they started and Malibya has not presented this
information to the local population. Moreover, I could not go to Kolongo, the site of Malibya,
due to security reasons. If I had gone, I would have been able to talk to families who were
being forced to move as well as see the progress, or lack thereof, of the project. I also wasted
time in Ségou waiting for an appointment at the Office of Niger and once I did interview
someone, it was hard to get real answers about Malibya. Due to these limitations, I decided to
expand the subject of my paper to food security and food sovereignty in Mali. When I
returned to Bamako, I arranged interviews with professional farmer organizations and an
agricultural research center. I had trouble getting additional interviews because people in
government offices were too busy to do an interview.
Where literature is concerned, I found a lot of information about rice production in
Mali and food sovereignty in Mali and West Africa. To create something unique from these
sources, I decided to pull facts from rice production in Mali and food sovereignty documents
and add to it my knowledge of Malibya for a new perspective on Malian agriculture. There
5

are some articles about the land grabs in Mali by private investors, but in-depth
documentation does not yet exist. I propose to explain how land-grabbing is affecting Mali
specifically, rather than the effects of all land grabs in the Global South. I also plan to explain
various agricultural initiatives in Mali and analyze whether they are successful for achieving
food security or food sovereignty.

Agriculture in Mali
Mali is one of the poorest countries in West Africa and is dependent on its agricultural
production. Seventy five percent of its active population is involved in agriculture and
agricultural production accounts for 43% of Mali’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 30%
of its exports.1 Cotton is the largest crop followed by those that require a rainy season—rice,
millet, sorghum, corn, and fonio. The production of cotton, rice, and livestock contribute to
75% of Mali’s agricultural growth. 2 In addition, the government spends 12-14% of its annual
budget on agriculture.3 Despite this spending, over half of Mali’s farmers do not own a
tractor.4 Increasing annual rice consumption puts pressure on Malian farmers to supply food
for the entire population; however, most farmers are unequipped to fulfill this demand.
The Ministry of Agriculture is striving for food sovereignty by making agricultural
production shift in accordance with the growth of Mali’s economy, implementing the
Agriculture Guidelines Law of 20065, beginning to use the National Agricultural

1

Sangare, Tiémoko. “Mot du Ministre. ” Ministry of Agriculture.
http://www.ma.gov.ml/contenu_page.aspx?pa=26. May 4, 2010.
2
Coulibaly, Moriba. “Salon international de l’Agriculture : UNE PARTICIPATION DE QUALITE. ” L'Essor.
April 26, 2010. http://www.ma.gov.ml/voir_actu.aspx?lactu=114. May 4, 2010.
3
Ibid
4
“The CNOP’s push for food sovereignty.” Interview with Lamine Coulibaly. Bamako, Mali. April 27, 2010.
5
The Agriculture Guidelines Law promotes irrigated rice systems by developing hydro-agricultural
technologies. It also provides strategies for helping workers leave subsistence farming to become cash
farmers ( “Mot du Ministre”).
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Development Fund, and producing 10 million tons of cereals in the year 2012.6 Ten million
tons will satisfy domestic needs and allow Mali to become a net exporter in cereals.7 In 20092010, Mali produced five million tons of cereals, the highest production rate Mali has ever
reached.8 Food sovereignty, as defined by Via Campesina at the World Food Summit in 1996,
is “the right of nations and governments to define their own agricultural and food policies.”9
The Ministry of Agriculture proposes to achieve these goals of food sovereignty by using
modern agricultural techniques, equipping farmers with the machinery they need to increase
production, and controlling the flow of water to irrigated land. These goals are especially
important for the Department of Agriculture’s biggest and most influential subsidiary—the
Office du Niger.
The Office du Niger was created in 1932 by French colonizers in the interior of the
Niger River delta. Its goal was to irrigate 1,000,000 hectares of land to facilitate the
production of cotton for exportation to France. The biggest project implemented by the Office
was the dam of Markala, constructed between 1934 and 1945. The dam exists today on the
Niger River 35km from the city of Ségou and is 816m long. The dam irrigates 86,000 ha each
year, leaving many hectares undeveloped.10

6

Republic of Mali. Minister of Communication and New Technologies. Volet agricole du Projet pour le
Développement Economique et Social du Mali (PDES).
http://www.ma.gov.ml/contenu_page.aspx?pa=29. May 4, 2010.
7
Republic of Mali. Ministry of Agriculture. National Strategy for the Development of Rice Growing. March
2009. 4
8
Songoré, Ibrahima. “Agriculture in Mali.” SIT Mali. March 5, 2010.
9
Blein, Roger and Emmanuel Jeudy. “Food sovereignty in West Africa:
From Principles to Reality.” Sahel and West Africa Club. Niamey: 2006.
10
“Histoire” Oct 8, 2009. http://www.office-duniger.org.ml/internet/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=3&Itemid=3. May 4,
2010.
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Cultivation of Rice in Mali

The production of rice represents 5% of Mali’s GDP.11 Rice consumption was
calculated at 57 kg/inhabitant/year, but Malian farmers cannot support this consumption;
hence, 45% of rice sold on the national market is imported.12 There are many varieties of rice
grown in Mali, each depending on the type of soil in the area. There are two types of rice
farming in Mali which correspond to location: irrigated systems and river flood plains.13
Government officials, professional peasant organization leaders, and exploitants (agricultural
workers) themselves all have different opinions on which types of rice are the best to grow.
This diversity could be the result of varying soil around the country, allowing different
varieties to work well in different regions.
Oumar Koné of the Department of Rural Advice at the Office du Niger advocates the
use of enriched rice in Mali. He says that not only does it produce more tons of rice per
hectare than local varieties, but the taste is also better for cooking, though it can prove
resistant to the local climate.14 Enriched rice takes less water when there are good conditions
for cultivation, according to Koné. The adapted rice used in Mali comes from Africa or Asia,
11

“National Strategy for the Development of Rice Growing.” 5
Ibid 5
13
Ibid 6
14
“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.” Interview with Oumar Koné. Ségou, Mali. April 21,
2010.
12
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specifically China or the Philippines. If local rice could be developed with modern
agricultural techniques, Mali could guard its local varieties while also increasing yields. Alas,
Koné says that this proposal could work in theory, but the condition of the soil is not good
enough.15 Ibrahima Songoré, a professor at ISFRA (Institut Supérieur de Formation et de
Recherche Appliquée) says that traditional rice has more nutrients, has a better taste, and is
more sustainable than enriched rice. Unfortunately, local rice is not popular with the Malian
population. The majority of Malians believe that enriched rice is better.16
It is essential for Mali to increase its productivity in order to achieve food security
without outside aid. If Mali can set its own rules and regulations of food production, it could
also achieve food sovereignty. Koné confirmed that Mali has had to import rice recently
because the amount it produced annually was not sufficient for the population. In the past, not
all Malians ate rice in their everyday diet, but now they do.17 Koné hopes that within the next
ten years, Mali will achieve food self-sufficiency. The plan by which this can be achieved is
first, to improve plots of land, and second, to intensify production with modern techniques,
technology packets and government programs—all of which will improve individual farmers’
yields, thus augmenting Mali’s rice yields on a national scale.18
The Institut d’Economie Rurale (IER) is the principle agricultural research structure in
Mali. They focus on food security and increasing production to combat poverty. The IER has
national, regional, and community level organizations for transferring their research results to
farmers.19 Though Dr. Lamissa Diakite, an agro-economist and researcher at the IER, favors
enriched rice, he values the importance of local types as well. “Even though local varieties
have a weak production rate, we must not completely destroy them because we still have a
15

“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”
Songoré, Ibrahima.
17
“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”
18
Ibid
19
“The Rural Economic Institute and Rice Research in Mali.” Interview with Dr. Lamissa Diakite. Bamako,
Mali. April 29, 2010.
16
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need for them.”20 Diakite is most concerned with food security for Mali, which means he
supports those varieties that can adapt to Mali’s climate and produce at the highest rate. “The
problem we have today with rice at a sub-regional market and international market is the
quality,” Diakite says. Mali cultivates some forms of Nerica (New Rice for Africa), of which
there are more than 40 types and which was first developed at the African Rice Center in
Benin. There are also many varieties of Gambiaka which originally comes from Gambia, but
has since been modified by multiple countries.21

Foreign Agricultural Investment in Mali
After Mali adopted its policy of decentralization in 1993, the government has
encouraged foreign investments in all sectors of its economy.22 Though many factories have
been closed down after privatization due to poor management, the country continues to make
agreements with multinationals and foreign governments.23 In the agricultural realm, the
government has recently signed away its farmland in three major agreements: 100,000 ha to
the Malian and Libyan joint project called Malibya, 11,288 ha to the Economic and Monetary
Union of West Africa (UEMOA), and 16,000 ha to the U.S. funded Millennium Challenge
Account.24
The biggest of these agreements, Malibya, was signed in 2008 and covers 10% of the
land under the control of the Office du Niger.25 Though Malibya’s size makes it the project
with the most potential to positively affect the growth of Mali’s economy, the dissemination
of information has, at most, left the Malian population confused. Villagers in the Kolongo
20

“The Rural Economic Institute and Rice Research in Mali.”
Ibid
22
Bonnal, Jean. Case Study: Republic of Mali. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.
http://www.ciesin.org/decentralization/English/CaseStudies/mali.html. May 9, 2010.
23
Guindo, Boubacar Mody. “Décentralisation au Mali.” SIT Lecture. March 22, 2010
24
Dia, C.A. “Office du Niger : LA RÉVOLUTION SE PRÉPARE.”
http://www.ma.gov.ml/voir_actu.aspx?lactu=38. May 4, 2010.
25
“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”
21
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region, the site of Malibya, had no information about the project when they were suddenly
told that some of their houses would have to be torn down.26 Government officials and
agricultural specialists know the basic goals of the project, but no specifics about the villagers
who will be displaced. The information does not fit together. Mali is vast and has a lot of land,
but if the Office du Niger continues to sign land to foreign investors, farmers in Mali will only
experience more and more problems.27

The Official Document of the Malibya Society
The official document for Malibya was signed at the Convention d’investissement
dans le Domaine agricole entre La République du Mali et La Grande Jamahiriya arabe
Libyenne populaire et socialiste. The dossier produced is short (six pages), vague, and gives a
lot of leeway to Libya. The preamble states that this project constitutes a “reinforcement of
the economic integration of the two countries…by the realization of strategic projects in the
common interest of the two countries.”28 The goals of the project are self-sufficiency and food
security, the development of agro-industry, and the development of the livestock industry.29
Article 4 states that if the land allotted is unavailable for any reason, the Malibya Society may
choose multiple sites in the region as long as they do not exceed 100,000 ha. The land grant
lasts for 50 years but is a renewable contract.30 The use of water, one of Mali’s most valuable
resources, is given freely to the project in Article 8: “The Republic of Mali is engaged to offer
the Malibya Society all the permits of water usage of the Macina canal as well as underground
water or both according to the needs of the project determined by the economic feasibility

26

“The State of Kolongo in the Midst of Malibya.” Interview with Charlotte Sama. Niono, Mali. April 15, 2010.
“The AOPP’s mission to help farmers.” Interview with Bréhima Dembele. Bamako, Mali. April 27, 2010.
28
Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. “Convention d’investissement dans le Domaine agricole entre
La République du Mali et La Grande Jamahiriya arabe Libyenne populaire et socialiste. ” Bamako.
2008. 1
29
Ibid 1
30
Ibid 2

27
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study.” The article continues to say that Malibya may use the quantity necessary and without
restriction in the months of June through December. During the dry season, the society will
cultivate products that take less water such as wheat, millet, corn, and other vegetables. 31
Water sources are limited in Sahelian countries like Mali; yet Malibya is able to use
any and all sources of water. In addition, the original canal in the region of Macina is already
subject to water-access problems throughout the year, according to Bréhima Dembele, the
Coordinator of the Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes (AOPP). Now,
the new 40 km canal of Malibya is going to take more water from this small canal. The water
will now flow into the new canal before the old one, leaving the region of Macina in dire
straits. “These plots of land already have problems with water because of traditional reasons,”
Dembele says. Now Malibya will make life in the Macina Circle more difficult.32
Malibya can build this canal because in addition to unlimited access to water, the
convention also allows the society free reign of the land for infrastructural purposes such as
canals, water pumps, electricity networks and “all necessary elements for a better-functioning
project,” as long as they are deemed necessary for access to the project site.33 There is a onesentence statement in Article 10 that says that the Republic of Mali has the right to inspect the
work of Malibya to confirm the usage of the best techniques for the development of land and
water.34 The oversight abilities that Mali has are somewhat limited in the document.
In Article 11, the text declares Malibya’s main objective as the production of
agriculture and livestock; however, the society can also develop “a part of the land for other
objectives in accordance with Mali.” This vague statement indicates that though it looks as
though Malibya is going to produce rice, wheat, millet, and corn, and develop the livestock
industry, they have the option to use the land for their own interests. One hundred thousand
31

Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. 3
“The AOPP’s mission to help farmers.”
33
Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. 3
34
Ibid 3
32
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hectares is a large amount of land to give away without specifying the exact purpose for
which it will be used. Furthermore, the next article, Article 12, discusses the chance that
precious stones, coal, or petroleum are found in the region. The article begins by saying that
with the discovery of any of the aforementioned resources, the land would immediately return
to the hands of Mali, and Malibya would receive new land and be compensated for any work
it has started.35 Then it says that “the Republic of Mali has the plain right if it wants, to share
participation in the development of these resources with its Libyan counterpart.”36 If any of
these resources are found, the Malian economy could benefit tremendously. Nevertheless,
Libya also has a stake in extracting these resources. Just as the rice produced by Malibya is
supposedly destined for all of West Africa, the resources would also supposedly be shared
between the two countries. In reality, Libya will benefit most from this rice production and
now has the opportunity to benefit from potential resources found in the area.
Nowhere in the convention is there a mention of villages that are already in the area or
houses that will need to be demolished. Article 13 says that Malibya is entitled to exploit “the
sand, stone, mud and anything that results from the land excavations in order to continue the
lakes and irrigation canals or the construction of roads.”37 Sand, stone, and mud are not the
only things standing in the way of Malibya’s project. Farmers have been cultivating the land
in West Macina for centuries and yet the document makes no mention of these people whose
lives will be forever changed. Twice, the verb “compensate” appears in the document. Both
times signify the Libyan party being compensated by its Malian counterpart.
Article 16 is materializing in the region today. It states that Malibya has the right to
hire foreign experts, use enriched rice and modern agricultural techniques, and use fertilizer

35

Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare 4
Ibid 4
37
Ibid 4
36
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products.38 The Chinese contracting company, China Géo-engineering Corporation (CGC
Mali) was the first to land on the scene to start the construction of roads and the canal. They
also have test fields for experimenting with the different types of hybrid rice that will adapt to
Mali’s climate. This section fails to include any environmental hazards that may accompany
the enriched rice and fertilizers used by the Malibya Society. Article 20 generally states that
Malibya will respect the laws of Mali that govern the protection and preservation of the
environment.39 It fails to mention the fact that many families are finding their environment
destroyed by this project.
The technical and economic feasibility studies to see what precautions and measures
need to be taken for the project to be successful are first mentioned in Article 5. Lamine
Coulibaly, Director of Communications at the Coordination Nationale des Organisations
Paysannes (CNOP) says that these studies were not done before CGC arrived and began work
on the infrastructure for the project.40 The document mentions the studies again in Article 21
saying that they will have a timeline between three and twelve months.41
Article 22 says that the law of Mali is the law followed by Malibya, yet families have
been uninformed about the amount of their compensation and misinformed about when they
will be compensated.42 Finally, the document ends by stating that any disputes between the
two parties will be settled outside of court.43 It is signed by Dr. Aboubacar al Mansoury,
Secretary of Agriculture and Herding Industries of Libya, and Pr. Tiémoko Sangare, Minister
of Agriculture of the Republic of Mali.44 Ideas for this project began as early as August 30,

38

Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. 4
Ibid 5
40
“The CNOP’s push for food sovereignty.”
41
Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. 5
42
Ibid 5
43
Ibid 5
44
Ibid 6
39
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1993 when an investment protocol was signed between the two countries; however, the “Plan
of Action” was signed in Bamako on May 9, 2008.45

Government Organizations’ Opinions on Malibya
When Mr. Koné of the Office du Niger was asked about the project, he said Malibya
has not yet started except for the CGC constructing the canal and testing hybrid varieties of
rice to see which type adapts best to the land. He had little to say on the subject besides the
fact that it is a government project and land should be given to those who have “the means to
produce.”46 He said that the project is going to increase the food supply for the Malian
population by exploiting many new varieties of rice, and women will benefit from the project
because Libya is planning to bring new techniques for gardening, a profession dominated by
women. Koné is unsure whether Malibya will create jobs for Malians, something Mali
desperately needs with an unemployment rate of 30%,47 but he doubts that Libya will bring its
own workers to the area.48
According to Koné, the villagers in the region are happy about the project because it is
a dry piece of land and Malibya will irrigate it. There have been no problems with the
villagers. When asked about those who will be displaced, he simply stated that no one has had
to move yet, and he does not know when that will be, but they will all be compensated when
that day comes. Meanwhile, Malibya set the date of April 26, 2010, only five days after the
interview, as the day on which the houses would be demolished. Furthermore, he said that the
villagers had no reaction when they heard of the project because it does not concern them
personally; Malibya is on a much larger scale.

45

Mansoury, Aboubacar al and Tiémoko Sangare. 5
“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”
47
“Mali” CIA World Factbook 2004. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ml.html. May 5, 2010.
48
“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”

46
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Malibya could disrupt the rice market for local sellers, but Koné said that villagers
have no say in the matter because Mali is a capitalist country and whatever happens to the rice
industry as a result of Malibya will be an outcome of capitalism. “It’s Mali who wins,” Koné
said, “and Mali would not sign an agreement in which it would not profit in some way.” He
added that the Office du Niger was content because “no one has ever tried to cultivate
100,000 hectares in five years!” Koné thinks highly of the project and Mali’s part in it. The
land stays with Mali. Libya invests to make a profit, yet Mali profits as well. The project
brings money into the country because Libya must pay Mali to use water, a resource of which
the Malibya Society is going to need a great amount.49
Dr. Diakite of the IER has a similar opinion. He says that Malibya and the
Millennium Challenge projects are, “some very good initiatives, some very good development
projects.”50 He adds that there is a lack of agricultural investment in Mali. Everything that has
been done and is going to be done is “fantastic” and everyone appreciates it, even the villagers
in the area.51 The branch of the IER in Niono works on researching different aspects for the
project such as water management, but outside of this research, the IER is not involved.52

The Local Response to the Malibya Society
In Niono, the atmosphere is a bit different. At the Union for Agricultural Workers in
the Office du Niger (SEXAGON), farmers meet from five regions once a month to discuss
issues afflicting them due to natural or unnatural factors. On April 15, 2010, the SEXAGON
had a heated debate about Malibya and what to do to help the villagers in the area.

49

“The Office of Niger and its Goal of Food Sovereignty.”
“The Rural Economic Institute and Rice Research in Mali.”
51
Ibid
52
Ibid

50
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“Malibya is the stupidest thing that the president has done since he started!” Faliiry Boly
said.53 Boly is the Secretary of the SEXAGON and works closely with all regions of the union
to ensure that farmers are well-represented. He has read the official document of Malibya and
thinks it is “too weak” and “not a real explanation.” It gives away Mali’s resources too easily
for the betterment of Libya and the project.54 Charlotte Sama, a member of the SEXAGON
who represents the Kolongo zone where the Malibya site is located, said, “We didn’t know
what it was at first.”55 Now, she has some details at her disposal, but the village as a whole is
still very confused. “Even if Malibya came to save us, someone has to inform us!” Sama
said.56
After the announcement of the Malibya agreement, people came from all over the
world to see what was going on.57 Not only are houses being destroyed, but cemeteries are
being moved or destroyed to make way for the canal.58 “What would the president think if his
father’s body was going to be moved from its resting place? I don’t think he would be too
happy,” Boly said.59 Boly believes that in order to combat Malibya, farmers, government
officials, and all Malian citizens need to be made sensitive to the situation. Farmers need to
know that they can fight against this decree. They can combat Malibya by having a united
front, having solid documentation, and meeting people who can help them. Boly wants to
organize a meeting with President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) so that the farmers can get
straight answers. He also wants to work with lawyers or jurists who can tell him exactly what
the laws of Mali are and how they affect the situation in the Macina region.60

53

“Malibya from the Niono Perspective.” Interview with Faliiry Boly. Niono, Mali. April 16, 2010.
Ibid
55
“The State of Kolongo in the Midst of Malibya.”
56
Ibid
57
“Malibya from the Niono Perspective.”
58
Ibid
59
Ibid
60
Ibid
54

17

Boly adds that the people who are being forced to move have nowhere to go. Unlike
the United States and other developed countries, most Malians construct their own houses and
then families live in the same compound for generations. Thus, giving families money to
move does not help them. They must find another piece of land; hopefully a plot similar to the
previous one so that they can continue to cultivate the same crops and make a living. Then,
they must construct the building materials, most likely mud bricks or cement blocks, and then
build the house. On top of this effort, Sama and Boly say that the amount given to families by
Malibya is not sufficient for this task.61
Because Sama lives in the region of Malibya, she was able to give a first-hand account
of the situation. She said that Malibya brought machines and the Chinese started building
roads. “We asked them what it was and they didn’t have an answer,” Sama said.62 No one
could tell them what was going on. Then a team sent by the government came to the region to
see which houses were going to be torn down and when the farmers realized this, they
revolted, and the team had the military brought in to stop the revolt—Malians against
Malians.63 The CGC began making the canal along 40 km in the Kolongo region. This is all
they have done so far and the people of Kolongo and Macina do not have any idea of when
the cultivation stage of the project is going to start.64 “We don’t even know if they’re only
cultivating rice or if they are going to cultivate millet, corn and wheat too. Also, we don’t
know if the rice is going to be for Mali, Libya, or the whole world,” Sama said.65 She
explained that even if enriched rice is supposed to produce the most tons per hectare, the
expected results may not come to fruition due to the different soil. Every field is different.66

61

“The State of Kolongo in the Midst of Malibya.”; “Malibya from the Niono Perspective.”
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Moreover, there are no Libyans there. There are only two Arabs, some Chinese people
working on infrastructure, and Malians who have been employed by Malibya.67 During this
work, the CGC destroyed a man-made bridge made by villagers which served as the only
means of traveling between two neighboring towns. Cars, motorcycles, bikes, and kids going
to school used this bridge every day and when the villagers asked the CGC to rebuild it, they
said that the bridge was not in their contract. The villagers turned to the government for help,
but they are still waiting for a response. It will cost 300 million CFA to reconstruct it, so the
government is hesitant to do it, says Sama. “So for now, we wait.”68
When the mayor informed residents that their houses would be torn down, the
villagers were hesitant to believe it. They tried to work with the mayor to figure out exactly
what was going on.69 Sama says that 58 houses will be torn down and the total compensation
is 130 million CFA which she believes is not sufficient for reconstruction.70 She also stated
that money is not enough for many people. She spoke of one man who worked his whole
adult life to acquire 34 hectares of land and when Malibya came to pay him to move, the
amount given to him could never equal the loss of his own fields. Others have lived there over
50 years and are “deeply saddened” by the situation.71
Sama has the foresight to see that Malibya’s goals could potentially help Mali;
however, she is disgusted with the way in which Malibya has started carrying out its plans.
She believes that Mali had to decentralize and privatize because Mali has no money to finance
these types of projects. As of our interview on April 15, 2010, most people had left their
homes already. The only families who stayed are the ones still waiting to be compensated. No

67

“The State of Kolongo in the Midst of Malibya.”
Ibid
69
Ibid
70
Daou, Mohamed. “L'OFFICE DU NIGER, Le PDG continue de "tourner." ” Echos. April 27, 2010.
http://www.bamanet.net/index.php/actualite/les-echos/8671-loffice-du-nigerle-pdg-continue-deqtournerq.html. May 4, 2010.
71
“The State of Kolongo in the Midst of Malibya.”
68

19

one is staying to resist because as Sama stated, “once they accept the money, that’s it. They
have to leave.” And no one wants to refuse “free” money.72
The SEXAGON also meets regularly with the Association of Professional Peasant
Organizations (AOPP) and the National Coordination of Peasant Organizations (CNOP) and
many SEXAGON union members are members of all three organizations. The AOPP said that
they would come to Niono to discuss strategies with the SEXAGON for combating the
Malibya project. While Boly believes that farmers can fight Malibya’s decision to take their
property, Sama says that the AOPP can only try to negotiate with Malibya for land other than
houses that is going to be destroyed, i.e. fields, bridges, and cemeteries, because it is too late
for the residents.73 The Malibya Society informed the village that they would be coming on
the 26th of April to demolish houses. On May 5, 2010, Sama confirmed that on April 27th the
houses were demolished.74

Accommodations for the displaced villagers
Mohamed Daou of Echos newspaper in Bamako wrote an article called “Touchees par
les Travaux du Chantier Malibya” on April 27, 2010 about accommodations built for the
displaced villagers in Kolongo. This is seemingly the only article in print that mentions
accommodations and even here, it is mentioned briefly in the last paragraph of a longer
article. It states that all local residents affected by the project will be moved to an area of 13
ha broken into 130 plots of land.75 “The 58 families affected by the project will be lodged
without any problem,” First Deputy to the Mayor of Kolongo Mohamed Ouédraogo said. He
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also expressed that two new cemeteries were arranged to replace the old ones. Ouédraogo
uses this information as proof that any rumors that the local population would not be
accommodated are not true and that, “all was made in the negotiation; all was done to
minimize the damage.”76
If the accommodations for residents were negotiated at the beginning, they were
neither included in the six-page document produced at the Convention nor announced to the
effected villagers. Ouédraogo continues to say that the Office du Niger should be commended
on its efforts for arranging these accommodations because, had they not, “half of Kolongo
would have had to leave.”77 Many villagers moved away on their own when they received
their sentence from Malibya, while others waited for their compensation so that they could
leave to build another house. No one mentioned villagers who stayed in light of possible
accommodations. Also, if the accommodations were made in the initial negotiations, then the
Office du Niger would not have had anything to do with it because they were not a part of
these meetings.78
When Bréhima Dembele of the AOPP was asked about the contents of this article he
had no information to confirm or dispute it. He said he had heard that this was happening, but
was on his way to Niono on May 6, 2010 to meet with AOPP members in the Kolongo region
about the situation.79 Charlotte Sama of Kolongo confirmed that some accommodations are in
the process of being built.80 “They’re not for everyone though,” she said. She also confirmed
that Malibya demolished the 58 houses on Tuesday, April 27, 2010, the same day that this
article was written. She also mentioned her meeting with the AOPP in Niono on May 6, 2010
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to discuss the situation.81 Finally, accommodations for multiple families on only 13 ha of land
would not be sufficient for all of the land these families are losing. Many families owned five
or even ten ha of land and thus, 13 ha would make living situations cramped and
uncomfortable for these people.

What Peasant Organizations Can Do to Help Farmers
The AOPP
The AOPP, Association des Organisations Paysannes Professionelles, is an
organization that takes care of producers of a variety of products including fruits and
vegetables, cereals, and cotton. Bréhima Dembele, the coordinator of the AOPP, thinks the
biggest problem for Malian farmers is the financing of the agricultural sector. Farmers lack
access to credit because interest rates are too elevated. Without credit, producers have no
access to better equipment which could increase their yields.82 There is also a lack of control
of water; thus, farmers who produce during the rainy season do not have anything to do for
the rest of the year.
“A producer has no power at the market,” Dembele says.83 There is no credit available
to store products or make transfers of stock between farmers. These are the factors that
separate wealthy farmers from the rest. Without access to credit, cultivators have little chance
for success. There are also problems of formation. There is an absence of an agricultural
policy that reaches the people. The government has recently set in place over 100 projects
dealing with agriculture; however, the farmers were not consulted.84 Dembele believes that
there is a lack of a vision for an agricultural politics: “If we had one,” he says, “maybe we
could solve the ensemble of problems we have.”
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Concerning the project of Malibya, Dembele says, “In principle, I can’t be against this
project.” But Malibya is not running on good principles. “Those who are informed are
generally for this project, but it’s those who are not informed who are against it,” he said.85
What Dembele means by this is that those who have read the official documents and
proposals of Malibya see it as a positive investment for the country, while on the other hand,
uninformed villagers who are being negatively affected by the project or even union members
who understand the views of both sides are against it. Yet in reality, no one can truly be
informed because the official document is inherently confusing. For example, the document
states that by developing these 100,000 hectares of land, the inflated price for a sack of rice
will finally become reasonable for the local population. As Dembele sarcastically put it, “Who
can say no to that?”
If citizens were informed about the problems Malibya is creating, they would be
against the project. Those most deeply affected by Malibya are the villagers in the Kolongo
and Macina Circle regions. Malibya made no effort to inform villagers or even local
authorities about what was going to happen to the land there.86 “People think it’s fields and
forests that are going to be torn up, but no—it’s villages!” Dembele said. The AOPP believes
that if the state proposes to bring investments like this, agricultural professionals must be
informed. Before being able to combat powerful investment groups, people must be informed
of both the basics and the specifics of the project—neither of which have been disseminated
to the public. Dembele says, “We want to inform all Malians about what is going on. We want
to do everything to stop Malibya in its current form.”87
The fields that Malibya are going to develop are located in a popular millet-producing
area. When asked if the project was going to disrupt the production of millet in Mali, he said
85
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that the question is not whether it will disrupt Malian millet production, but rather what the
people who are there are going to become and where they are going to go.88 He is very
concerned about the people, which is definitely the first problem to be discussed. Malibya has
not started much of the project besides building a 40 km canal, testing hybrid types of rice in a
few fields, and most importantly, evicting families from their homes.
The Millennium Challenge Account is in the process of implementing a similar project
in Alatoona, a region also covered by the Office du Niger. They are taking fields with a lot of
potential and turning them into high-yielding rice fields. Though they are only developing
18,000 ha of land, they are taking the displacement of villagers seriously. They built another
village with nicer houses than the villagers had previously. They also gave them new plots of
land and showed them how to grow rice instead of millet. After explaining this, Dembele
compared the project to Malibya and said, “It’s the principle, or better yet the philosophy of
Malibya that is immoral. It’s really not normal. We cannot engage ourselves in projects like
that.”89
According to Dembele, not all of the displaced families have been compensated yet
and some are even trying to save as much of their houses as they can by breaking down their
own houses to save the materials. This fear makes sense because, according to Sama, Boly,
Dembele, and Coulibaly, the compensation is not sufficient to fund the construction of a new
house. Depending on how much land a farmer had, the amount of compensation will be
different. Some people, Dembele said, are not even capable of building a new house or even
making mud bricks.90 “The project could never help the farmers,” Dembele said. He added
that all farmers want is to have the means to live with their families in the best conditions
possible. “We don’t want to be farmers for someone, but for ourselves,” he explained. They
88
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do not know if the rice that will be produced will be sold in Mali or abroad; but, Malibya is
going to try to produce rice that is less expensive than that of local producers—so local
producers will lose.91
The AOPP is planning to go to the area and create a forum to inform people, discuss
issues, and alert the national and international press. They want to negotiate with the state on
behalf of the villagers, but they, along with the villagers, must be informed of all that the
project is doing before talking to the state. Dembele said that if villagers are updated on what
is going on in the official document, then the AOPP can go to the government and say: this is
what we agree with and this is what we do not agree with. “Then the state will have to listen
to us,” he said.92 The question is how to inform the Malian population.
Though seeing the situation firsthand can be powerful, Dembele knows that he
“cannot bring all Malians to Ségou or Niono.” Because Malians are not in the habit of
reading, the “radio of proximity” will be the primary method for disseminating information.93
There is a specific AOPP radio network that broadcasts in all regions of Mali. Earlier in April,
Dembele went to Gao to help rice farmers in the North and there were farmers from all
regions of Mali, including Niono and Kolongo, who had come to help support these rice
farmers. “It’s this synergy among farmers of Mali that we want to develop,” Dembele said.
Cultivators in one region should be aware of the problems of those in every other region of
Mali.94

The CNOP
The CNOP, Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes, works on
connecting farmer organizations and government officials to help make farmers’ voices heard.
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Their members include 11 regional organizations, each of which represents multiple local
peasant organizations. The ultimate goal of the CNOP is to allow peasant organizations “to
contribute to the definition of a clear vision of Malian agriculture and a coherent politics of
agriculture centered on familial agricultural workers.”95 Lamine Coulibaly, Director of
Communications at the CNOP, believes that there are enormous problems facing farmers
today, especially speculation foncière—investment in stock or property at high risks.96
“Foreign investors are trying to shake our country,” Coulibaly said. This is becoming the
biggest worry for peasants in Mali. Conversely, the biggest obstacle for the CNOP to help
farmers concerns the Agriculture Guidelines Law of 2006. Because the CNOP played a major
part in the law-making process, they are required to help implement it; but the application of
the law is posing problems.97
Coulibaly, who wrote an article, “Libyan Land Grab of Mali’s Rice-Producing Land,”
which has been translated into four languages, is concerned about Malibya because the
company failed to execute any preliminary studies on feasibility and environmental or social
risks before it began working. 98 The people in these villages saw the Chinese working and
had no idea what was happening. When people started asking questions, only then did
Malibya think to do a three-month study to decide how many houses, gardens, fields, and
cemeteries should be destroyed to make way for the canal.99
The CNOP asked the government for compensation for landowners in the area and the
government replied that the prime minister had already passed by Kolongo to survey the area
and that the money is available—but presently, nothing has been done. Coulibaly said that
160 families will be affected and 58 will have their houses taken. It is Coulibaly’s opinion
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that the taste of hybrid rice from China is not good. He worries that this hybrid rice will
negatively affect local varieties of rice. Eight tons per hectare is excessive for Mali’s soil, and
a local farmer who produces two tons per hectare cannot compete with those who produce
eight tons per hectare. In addition, the consumption of rice has surpassed that of millet.100
“Mali is a country of familial agriculture.”101 By this, Coulibaly means subsistence
farming—each farmer has his fields and produces enough for his family. If there is a surplus,
they sell the extra in the market for a profit. Modern agriculture is not the norm.
The official document of Malibya is not at all sensitive to these farmers in the region.
Coulibaly cannot believe that neither the farmers nor the Office du Niger were implicated in
the decision-making process. He even talked to an advisor to the Minister of Agriculture who
was not included in the plans for Malibya until two months after the documents were
signed.102 The first convention where Malibya documents were signed was very private. Now,
details of the project remain hidden and everyone must wait and observe what is happening
before further action can be taken. Coulibaly notes that even if the future of the project turns
out as planned, it will not help Mali.103 “Imagine a farmer who only has one or two hectares
on the side of a multinational who has 100,000 hectares. It’s clear that these farmers will be
devoured by these investors,” Coulibaly said.
Furthermore, the Office du Niger director of the zone of Kolongo was completely
against the project at first, but later he completely changed his opinion to favor the project.
According to Coulibaly, the director said that Malibya was a fund that could help Mali to
improve its rice production. Coulibaly understands why Mali made this decision: Mali does
not have the means to convert farmland so they must look to foreign investors such as Libya.
They employ Libya to develop the land and then at the end of the contract, the land returns to
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the state.104 It is a “win-win situation” for the Malian government. But in reality, Coulibaly
says, “It’s truly a production destined to go to Libya… If we don’t try to find a solution now,
everything will fall apart.”105 The CNOP plans to organize a 400 km march starting in the
zone of Malibya and ending in Bamako.106

Overview of SEXAGON

If Mali could develop its own land initiatives by talking to the agricultural producers,
the country would have a greater chance at achieving food security and food sovereignty.
Though most Malian farmers are poor and cultivate on a small scale, they know what they
need to improve their rate of production. Take the SEXAGON, for example. The SEXAGON,
or the Union of the Agricultural Workers of the Office du Niger, is a union of agricultural
producers in the region of the Office du Niger that started because farmers in the region felt
they were not being well-represented.
The SEXAGON was created in 1997, and today it is the biggest union in the region of
the Office du Niger.107 It represents farmers in five administrative zones within the Office:
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Niono, Molodo, N’débougou, Kouroumari, and Macina. It is composed of mostly rice
producers, but also includes some cattle herders and market gardeners. The union acts to
obtain the best services from the Office du Niger in terms of maintenance and conversions of
irrigation systems and secure access to land for farmers. Their mission also expresses that,
“the fight against the evictions of farmers was and remains an important fight.” For a union
to be self-created to combat this trend specifically, it is clear that evictions are an age-old
problem in the region. Additionally, the SEXAGON looks for ways to improve the lives of
subsistence farmers through commercialization techniques.108
To help combat the poverty of farmers in the region, the SEXAGON spent seven years
devising a plan for cooperatives in the region to improve production, a much more thorough
feasibility study than the three month study that Malibya is supposed to conduct.109 The
SEXAGON created cooperatives because the proposed price of rice by the Office du Niger
was, in the farmers’ opinions, too low, and “without a doubt made from the dominant position
of the big producers who can impose their prices on unorganized farmers.”110 The principal
objectives of the cooperatives are to resolve problems linked to water payments, supply
mineral fertilizer at the best price and quality, good transformation practices of paddy or grain
rice for a good production rate, and the commercialization of rice stock.111
“Land is for all of us,” Boly says. As Secretary of the SEXAGON and Director of the
Cooperatives, Boly played a major role in creating cooperatives in the region. Boly believes
in his work and the fact that unions and cooperatives are the best way to increase the yields of
farmers in a fair way.112 The cooperatives use small loans to operate, which also teaches
farmers about paying back credit so that they can be successful. Boly started the cooperatives
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for three reasons: to increase the development of plots of land, to allow producers to take part
in the process, and to have access to credit for farmers. However, there is a problem with the
way credit works in Mali because the interest rates are too high. Farmers would greatly
benefit from having credit that they could invest for 20, 30, or 50 years before paying it back.
They would also benefit if credit was renewable.113
“We need to organize ourselves a lot more. We work harder, but we don’t win,” Boly
says. He is referring to the difference between farmers who use modern agricultural
technology and farmers who do not, i.e. the majority of farmers in Mali. Boly has faith that it
is easy to profit as a rice farmer in Niono if you are well-organized. There is money to be
made in the regions covered by the SEXAGON, but organization is the key. Molodo, the
village Boly lives in which is a ten minute drive outside of Niono has a lot of potential, but is
not organized in a productive way.114
Accordingly, it took seven years to organize the cooperatives, but it is better to be
thorough than to be fast and make mistakes (The SEXAGON made a 35 page report while the
Malibya agreement is only six pages.). Now there are 70 cooperatives set in place with 48
that are working successfully, i.e. paying back 100% of their credit. Some groups do not have
the money to pay back the credit, while others simply do not understand the concept of credit,
i.e. giving money back that was given to you.115
“We have traditional ways of working, but people are starting to understand that, for
example, putting things in writing makes it more official—it makes people listen to you and
believe in what you are saying,” Boly says. The SEXAGON bought writing materials and
messenger bags for everyone in the union to facilitate writing, though some people still arrive
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at meetings without writing down what they have to say. But he believes that this attitude is
changing in a positive direction and is willing to keep working until his goals are achieved.116
The SEXAGON bought a rice-processing machine from China that they started using
on Monday, April 19, 2010. The union members were very excited to start using it because it
is their own machine that can increase production rates in their village. In many ways, these
farmers want the same things as the government: to increase production and make a profit. If
the government is able to give workers the tools to become cash-crop farmers, then everyone
would profit and be working toward a common goal. The objectives of the SEXAGON are
similar to those set by the SIAGRI (Salle Internationale d’Agriculture ) at a conference in
Bamako from April 24-30.

Agricultural Goals of the Government
From April 24-30, Bamako’s Palais de la Culture hosted a conference called “Food
Sovereignty for a Sustainable Agriculture” and the use of modern agricultural technology was
at the top of the discussion list. In an article from Info Matin on April 26, 2010 by Bertin
Dakouo called “Cap sur la Modernization de l’Agriculture” (Course for the Modernization of
Agriculture), Dakouo writes about the need Mali has for modern agriculture. Boubacar Ba,
mayor of Commune V in Bamako, is quoted saying that, “as long as the prices of our products
are higher than those of imported products, our country will not attain its objectives of food
security.”117 Alas, Mali can achieve food security by importing cheap, left-over food from
developed countries, a phenomenon known as export dumping, but to achieve food
sovereignty, Mali will need to combat this trend.
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The definition of food sovereignty developed by Via Campesina at the World Food
Summit in 1996 is expressed as “the right of nations and governments to define their own
agricultural and food policies.”118 This definition does not always correlate to producing your
own food, but rather to policies that will benefit your country’s producers and consumers. On
the other hand, food security exists “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs, as well as to
culturally acceptable food preferences for an active and healthy life.”119 The access to food
this sense can come from national or international producers.
President of the Assemblé Permanente des Chambers d’Agriculture (APCAM) Bakary
Togola believes that “Mali is not poor in natural resources, but rather it is poor in innovative
ideas for valorizing its resources.”120 Togola also pleaded for banks to be on the side of
producers with respect to reimbursing loans. He believes that the use of enriched seeds will
aid Mali in its goal of food security. To attain its goals, Mali must make a distinction between
food security and food sovereignty before moving forward. Togola’s goals are for attaining
food security, but require food sovereignty. If Mali is able to provide food security for its own
people, it will, at the same time, achieve food sovereignty.
The AOPP supports the notion of food sovereignty and Dembele understands the
confusion between food security and food sovereignty, noting that many organizations are
against sovereignty in order to achieve security first.121 The most popular approach to support
food security is to buy the cheapest food—which most likely comes from the United States,
Japan, or other developed countries.122 Engaging in export dumping in this way only
exacerbates small farmers’ efforts to sell food in local, regional, or national markets. “If you
118
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really want to help us,” Dembele says, “come and buy rice from local markets. Give money to
those who do not have the means.” Dembele says that the AOPP can defend what they stand
for by helping farmers to carry out self-made initiatives. If the AOPP can help in this way,
Mali can achieve food sovereignty.123
Coulibaly of the CNOP says that, “We can’t achieve food sovereignty without
improving familial agriculture.” He believes in creating a solid political campaign at the
lowest level—a politics for farmers and their families. Coulibaly is right about improving
familial agriculture: a recent Food and Agriculture Organization report stated that over 50%
of Malian farmers do not have a plough. Without a plough, a farmer cannot start to harvest.
One must wait for someone with a plough to finish cultivating so that he can use it.124
Another obstacle facing farmers is the high price of fertilizer. Fertilizer is unavailable
for rice cultivators at the moment. Sacks of fertilizer cost 22,500 CFA, but with subsidies it is
only 12,500 CFA per sack, a price which has never been that low.125 The government is in the
process of enacting this subsidy which means that, “today is a great opportunity to help
familial agriculture. It is initiatives like this that we hope the state will continue to
develop.”126 Farmers would benefit from plough and labor subsidies as well. It costs 50,000
CFA to hire someone to cultivate one hectare of rice fields plus other expenses outside of
labor. According to Coulibaly, “There is a strong demand for land by farmers as well.” So he
asks, “Why doesn’t the government give land to these farmers?” Coulibaly has hope for the
government to follow through on agricultural initiatives because the three highest areas of
state spending are on education, health, and agriculture.127 If the government follows through
on these initiatives, Mali can successfully acquire food sovereignty.
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Dr. Diakite of the IER believes that to achieve food self-sufficiency, food security and
food sovereignty, Mali must increase its stock for export, allow farmers to have access to
infrastructure, credit, and other resources, and support a good quality of rice that will augment
the health of the population.128 When asked what the farmers can do to increase their yields,
Diakite explained that they need to invest well and use organic materials, i.e. composting, to
enrich the soil. Diakite acquiesced that farmers do not have the tools to cultivate enriched rice,
but said that farmers “must have courage” to improve their lot. 129 Concrete government
projects would help farmers more than courage.

A Glimpse into a Better Future for Malian Farmers
The SEXAGON believes that it knows best when it comes to rice fields, although the
members are not against outside advice where needed. Boly goes to France periodically for
conferences on agriculture and brings the knowledge back to Niono and the regions of the
SEXAGON. He also seeks judicial advice from a professor at the University of Bamako for
help with property laws concerning Malibya and other projects that have caused evictions in
the past.130 Sometimes outside help is exactly what farmers need to produce higher yields.
And helping farmers to increase production on land they already own does not violate their
sovereignty.
A study done by the African Rice Center in Sikasso, Mali and Niono, Mali showed
that with the proper training, farmers could successfully manage their own pest problems,
thereby obtaining higher yields during the harvest season.131 “There is a growing realization
that future agricultural growth hinges on smallholder farmers, who must be knowledgeable
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and exposed to a learning process that involves continuous observation and feedback from the
local environment.”132 The study passed out training manuals in Bambara and made
questionnaires to record farmers’ perceptions, constraints, and local knowledge. Before
beginning training, those carrying out the study explained the farmers’ problems that were
collected from the questionnaires. The farmers selected for the study were trained in many
areas including using a field notebook for observations, planting different seed varieties,
following a cultural calendar, using improved techniques, using natural and chemical
pesticides, using mineral and organic fertilizer, and rotating crops.133
After training, the farmers harvested more crops and were able to keep them healthy.
The trained farmers improved or maintained their levels in all aspects of the study (see figure
1). In this case, outside help proved necessary for farmers to combat pests. The study also
said that farmers in Niono were much more knowledgeable before the study than those of
Sikasso. Perhaps that is because the SEXAGON takes the time to inform its farmers of
solutions to their problems.
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Conclusion
Boly has many hopes for the future of agriculture in Mali. He would like farmers to be
able to export within the region, be well-organized, have access to cheaper fertilizer and have
a guaranteed fund. He says that there needs to be a change in mentality of rice farmers. The
idea of credit is a foreign one to most farmers and they need to understand that they have to
pay money back in order to be successful. Additionally farmers would benefit from better
communication channels between farmers, credit organizations, and government so that all
parties could work together to achieve a common goal.134 Likewise, the Office du Niger and
the Ministry of Agriculture have optimistic aspirations for the future of agriculture. Abou
Sow, Secretary of State in charge of the Office of Niger, advocates a mechanized agriculture,
an increased exportation of products cultivated in the Office du Niger region, and
microfinance for local producers to buy machines.135
The Ministry of Agriculture, the Office du Niger, professional peasant organizations,
and farmers unions all strive for a successful agricultural production in Mali. While the
strategies implemented to achieve these goals change from level to level, the basic idea is the
same: to help farmers to increase their production to feed Mali and become an exporter in the
region. Projects like Malibya forget to keep the farmers first. As Boly says, “Only Malian
rice farmers know what Malian rice farmers need.”136 To reiterate the words of Bréhima
Dembele of the AOPP and Lamine Coulibaly of the CNOP, an agricultural policy for the
people is greatly needed in Mali. It would facilitate communication channels between
government officials and producers. Maybe then solid information would be passed to farmers
in places like Kolongo and Niono. Maybe then houses would not be demolished, leaving
people with nowhere to go. And maybe then the government would know how to fund that
134
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which farmers need the most—things like fertilizer and access to credit. If the government
and farmers worked together in this way, Mali could become a food sovereign country faster
that it takes to sign another document with a foreign investor.

37

Appendix 1
Map of the five regions encompassed by the SEXAGON

(Note: Malibya is the big project on the far right of the map)
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